There is a lot of good in this book, and I will get to it, but I have to begin by remarking that it is staggeringly repetitious. The same basic points are repeatedly endlessly, as if the author is trying to beat them into unwilling heads rather than convince anyone. I happen to agree with most of the author's positions, but that didn't stop me from quickly tiring of hearing them. Someone who begins with less sympathy for the ideas will find it doubly unpleasant.

You might think this is the result of hair-splitting legalisms, but the opposite is true. The book is best when the author is clearly and simply explaining esoteric (to a lay person anyway) but essential legal technicalities. This is in fact the best reason to read the book. Many people have general ideas about procedural barriers to justice such as the doctrine of sovereign immunity or narrow criteria for standing. This book describes these and other barriers elegantly, including historical context, legal theory and real examples of how they affect real people.

It's when the author is on weaker ground that quantity of words starts replacing quality. We read over and over that if someone is not allowed to litigate a Constitutional claim in federal court that it is equivalent to the right not existing. But that's absurd. For one thing, there are many other avenues to enforce Constitutional rights. For another, every case has at least two sides so unlimited rights to sue over alleged Constitutional violations implies unlimited exposure to expense, risk and trauma of a lawsuit. There's no reason to make a federal case out of every dispute.

The book devotes many pages to the uncontroversial position that federal courts have an essential last word in upholding the Constitution, but the idea that federal courts should cure every Constitutional violation is like a claim that the Environmental Protection Agency should eliminate all human impact on the environment. One reasonable view of both federal courts and the EPA is they should do what written and traditional law require them to do. A more romantic view is that these institutions have duties beyond mere law, but if so, those duties have to be to balance things: justice versus litigation costs (money, time, risk, prolonging of disputes, evisceration of alternatives including non-federal courts, legislatures, executives, social pressure and others) for the federal courts, pollution versus economic and liberty costs for the EPA.

This is particularly relevant because in all the cases discussed in the book, the petitioner had gone through other courts or investigative procedures, but was not happy with the outcome. From a social utility standpoint, as opposed to a legal one, a federal court should only get involved if it can deliver a more just outcome, and the increase in justice outweighs the costs of litigation. The author never discusses either the likelihood that the federal judge will improve on the earlier judges, or the costs of the procedure. Courts, including federal courts, make lots of mistakes of fact, and not all by accident. Historically, federal judges have distinguished themselves for decisions considered evil from a modern perspective as much as for enlightened decisions. That's not to say that federal verdicts are bad or random, just that they cannot assumed to be uniformly wise and good.

I like to think of procedural rules in the era of trial by combat or trial by ordeal. For one thing, their basic character was formed in these times. For another, it removes the unwarranted assumption that the court has ability to determine the right verdict and forces consideration of the cost of contest. If you regard the court contest as a random outcome, the purpose of procedure is to make sure the right parties are assembled with the right issues in play, so that regardless of which side kills the other, the dispute is ended and will not fester or lead to cycles of violence. With a perfect system of legal procedure, each case would be argued exactly once.

Now, of course, trials are not as random or costly as throwing someone into a river to see if they drown, so there is room in the world for appeals and federal court review. But the author seems to feel there is unlimited room. I disagree.

Where I agree fully with the author is that federal courts should be particularly sensitive to the rights of poor, helpless and despised people. If you slam the courthouse door on a rich, connected, beloved person, she has alternatives. But for a convicted child molester with no friends or family, a federal court is about the only place to get a fair hearing, and that applies even if he was wrongfully convicted or if his mistreatment was severe.

I further agree that federal courts should be activist when the government over-reaches, regardless of the characteristics of the victim. If one person violates another person's Constitutional rights, it affects one person. If the government does it, it affects all of us. If federal courts let governments get away with this, as they seem to about half the time, they betray their core function. There are lots of ways to resolve disputes--state courts, arbitration, regulatory hearings, mediation--but only a few non-violent ways to keep tyranny in check.

This leads to a point of minor disagreement I have with the author. He blames conservative justices, whereas I would blame judges too deferential to legislatures and executives. This is a sin common on Left as well as the Right, depending on the government overreach at issue. I think he could have found equally good examples where it was liberal justices slamming the door, and it would have given a more accurate illustration of the problems.

Overall, this book is hard to read due to weak arguments recycled and overstated, but it contains some good arguments as well, Its great virtue is in the technical legal information integrated into real cases.