As I join the foreign service, and complete as second bachelor's degree in international relations, this has been an excellent "homework" read for me. Well written, and makes complex ideas and situations easier to understand.

The Return of Marco Polo's World was a book I felt a little conflicted by.

First off, the essays that made up the middle of the book, originally published in The Atlantic, are based around a number of subjects. There are articles about various thinkers and advisors who tried to guide US foreign policy in a very pragmatic direction. Following high morals just does not work, since what works in North America and Europe isn't necessarily going to work in other parts of the work, and trying to force Western-style democracy on the middle east or Asia is likely to cause even more chaos than is already there. The author, and the subjects of his essays, push a more pragmatic stance of looking at possible interventions and making choices based on whether it will be good for the security of the US, not whether it is the 'moral' thing to do.

The essays on the morass of the middle-east follow similar thought paths -- only step in if it will, in some way, make things better for the US.

It's a somewhat cynical, and very pragmatic, look at foreign policy, and where its focus should be. As someone who is pretty left-wing (in a country that is also very left-wing), I found myself heavily agreeing with him there. I'm left-wing at home, but feel that we should let other countries work out their problems. Provide aid where they need it, but not try to police them. Iraq under Hussein was not good, but is it really any better now? Or further back, the US interfered in Afghanistan in the cold war days, and while they knocked the USSR out of the country, the result was the Taliban, and later Al-Qaeda.

Unfortunately, the opening and closing pieces, written (or heavily revised) for the book are less successful. The opening attempts to tie Marco Polo's era into the present, travelling along the corridor that China wants to develop with high-speed travel as a modern version of the Silk Road. To be honest, that piece dragged, and the sentence structure was so tortured that I had to keep rereading paragraphs to make sure of what he was saying. As well, he periodically threw in words that I had to look up. I consider myself well-read with a large vocabulary, but in several places I came across words that I couldn't even figure out from the context. Thankfully, my Kobo has a word lookup dictionary.

The closing piece, on China, was shorter, but again went for the overdone language. It made me wish that those two pieces had the same editor as the magazine essays.

In the end, the book's contents had little to do with the title, although the subtitle was a clear description of the contents. I just wished that it had been billed more as an essay collection than trying to force in a theme that only really showed up in the opening that was, to me, superfluous.

But looking at only the magazine essays, this is a book well worth reading.

THE RETURN OF MARCO POLO'S WORLD by best-selling author Robert D. Kaplan (March 6, Random House) examines the interplay between cultures and economics/trade through a series of essays. Kaplan is known as a strategic thinker and while the execution seemed a bit dry at times, the subject matter is fascinating and his text received a starred review from Kirkus.

The Return of Marco Polo's World: War, Strategy, and American Interests in the Twenty-First Century by Robert D Kaplan is a collection of articles on foreign policy. Kaplan is an American author. His books are on politics, primarily foreign affairs, and travel. His work over three decades has appeared in The Atlantic, The Washington Post, The New York Times, The New Republic, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs and The Wall Street Journal, among other newspapers and publications. His more controversial essays are about the nature of US power and have spurred debate and criticism in academia, the media, and the highest levels of government.

In the world of foreign policy, there are two camps. The realists are based on nations acting in their own interests and closely associated with Kissinger in Us policy. The liberal camp believes in collective actions and policies based on generally held beliefs like human rights. In American thinking, it is closely tied to Woodrow Wilson and international cooperation. Without the slightest bit of doubt, Kaplan is a realist. A rational thinking realist, but still a realist. He makes a point of describing the biggest flaw in the liberal theory when points are made on moral or ethical grounds there can be no opposition or variance -- if you do not act to stop genocide, then you support genocide. There is no in-between position.  It is a difficult position to hold and defend in a world where everything is not black and white. 

Kaplan pictures Europe fracturing and unruliness moving in. In France, there is a rise of the National Front. In Germany, there are more incidents of right-wing extremism. These are popular movements by those fearing immigration, job loss, and identity. Eurasia, meanwhile, begins to strengthen using technology, globalization, and geopolitics. Globalization leads to the weakening of culture and religion. This affects different countries differently. In the Middle East, it has met with violence and radicalism. Other areas are taking advantage. Given to the title of this book, China is trying to build a new silk road: Harbors and high-speed rail in Pakistan and railroads and highways in Africa. Trade and trade advantage has become the goal of China. Iran is also in a position to become a regional power, but declines to do so because of the religious leadership sees integration into the capitalist systems as a treat to Islamic ideology. China traditionally deals with all regimes, good or evil. It takes a true Machiavellian stance in its foreign relations. China changes as the situation changes.

The rest of the book is a collection of previously published articles covering issues from Trump to the growing limitations of the US military.  Kaplan explains drone attacks are not a sign of American strength, but a sign of its limitations.  The US uses drones to knock out targets without engaging military forces against the threat.  It hopes to end problems by picking off parts of the problem.  The US does remain the undisputed maritime power in the world.  Able to sit safely off coasts and strike inland with missiles and aircraft. American maritime power also tasks itself in ensuring sea lanes are open and the supply of petrochemical are available to allies. Something China enjoys without cost. 

Kaplan uses current and past foreign and domestic issues to build upon his thesis.  Of course, one can argue against any of his positions as well as for them.  This is something I recall having to do repeatedly in graduate school -- defending and rejecting the same piece of policy.  Kaplan defends his position well and although holes can be found in his thinking, they are very small holes in the big picture.  Kaplan presents a thoroughly researched and thought out position on foreign policy.

This book may help explain why the rest of the world hates U.S. foreign and 'defense' policies.

Kaplan says that Chile and China supported by the USA were successes of capitalism, even though both have mixed economies. The USA's economy is pretty mixed with a large amount of government control and support, does that then make its success a victory for Socialism? Also the Bolsheviks were heavily dependent on their American investors such as GE not only for industrial credits but also for their planning ideas generally. Perhaps then the 1917 revolution was also a victory for capitalism.

In truth Kaplan does not really appear interested in any ideals or ideology merely that his side wins. And for that we must consider him the exponent of failure as he admits so many things in his book where what he proposed has failed, such as his support for the Iraq War.

Perhaps this book is something everyone should read. Why did people stop believing in the American policy of intervening globally and elect Trump? As an exponent of the opposite policy Kaplan outlines what is no longer the prevailing opinion. The world of war that Kaplan promotes is probably a very good reason to try something else.


He says his support for the Iraq war was not a mistake because its just about everyone else's, such as bad leadership, information they didn't know and

For decades, Robert Kaplan has immersed himself in conflict. He is an acknowledged expert, and in The Return of Marco Polo’s World, he looks both forward and backward. What he sees is more of the same, but geographically shifting to Eurasia.

The best section by far is the first, where he analyzes the state of the world and projects future conflagrations from past experience and current developments. China is his focus, with its national policy on trading along the Marco Polo Silk Road, west towards India, Africa and Europe. He explores its newfound military expansion on the oceans, something China has studiously avoided for 3000 years. But now that it has consolidated its land territories, sown instability in the smaller states on its borders, and understood the value of trade routes, the seas have taken on immense urgency.

The rest of the book is reprints of articles he has written for the likes of National Interest and Atlantic. He examines the warrior class and the mentality of soldiers and how they are an almost entirely different subspecies. And that we need to recognize that. He also profiles some right wing celebrities like Henry Kissinger, who he absolutely idolizes, whether he admits it or not. Three hagiographies reprinted here are the least credible or insightful. Kaplan is much better at strategy. He lives in a tense, violent, military-centric world. His observations are tightly focused - depressingly so - but when he lets his ultra-conservatism surface, he weakens.

In May 2016, six months before the presidential election, Kaplan wrote (in National Interest) “The twenty-first century will be defined by vulgar populist anarchy that elites at places like Aspen and Davos will have less and less influence upon, and will less and less be able to comprehend. Imperialism, then, will be viewed as much with nostalgia as with disdain.” He does not and has never appreciated Donald Trump’s grasp of world affairs, saying he is no realist. For Kaplan, realism is the gloomy opposite of idealism, the unachievable. He quotes Jean Lartiguy in this paradox: “How do you explain that to save liberty, liberty must first be suppressed?”

There’s a lot to disagree with, something Kaplan acknowledges up front. He says Boko Haram and the Lord’s Resistance Army “are, in fact, redemptive millennial movements that are a response to the twin threats of modernism and globalization.” No they aren’t. They’re conscripted criminal gangs whose only concerns are power and wealth over everyone else. Intellectualizing them is absurd.

The other main fault is Kaplan’s total failure to account for climate change. While the military are busy making climate conferences profitable all over the world by showing up in unprecedented numbers, land shrinkage, water shortages and climate refugees do not figure in his calculations at all. Still, he is perceptive to a terrific degree, even to acknowledging that Shakespeare had more to tell us about dictators and rises and falls, than all the expensive analysis piling up in think tanks and bookstores. So it’s a worthy adventure with a qualified guide.

David Wineberg

I'd rate this higher if I hadn't seen all these essays before--this is a collection of Kaplan's pieces, largely for The Atlantic, on his belief in Central Asia as an emerging center of gravity, and China and Russia's roles there as regional hegemons, as well as promotion of American naval reach as a lifeline. There's a roundup book review about Vietnam memoirs that is worth revisiting, but I don't think he's got a good handle on recent studies of Mongol rule if he's going to make Marco Polo extended metaphors.