Michael Beckley’s Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower is a very balanced, considered and compelling argument against the view put forward by many commentators that American supremacy is on the wane and that China is destined to replace it. He does not argue that the US is invincible or that US hegemony will last forever, but that predictions of US decline have been overstated. It is difficult to argue with his assessment.

Beckley references the multitude of literature predicting the continued rise of China, gradually overtaking the USA in world predominance. He argues that such predictions suffer from two primary shortcomings that distort people’s perceptions of the balance of power. Firstly, that they use gross indicators such as GDP and military spending to measure power but do not take into account welfare and security burdens thereby exaggerating the wealth and power of poor, populous nations like China and India. Secondly, that they rely on historical notions about the rise and fall of great powers that do not really apply today. He argues that the USA “enjoys a unique set of geographic, demographic and institutional advantages that translate into a commanding geopolitical position.”

He is right on both counts. Technology has made the world smaller which, in turn, has given the US hegemony on a scale not seen before. It cannot be compared to the empires of the past. Only a few commentators seem to recognise these points; my compatriot David Kilcullen being one of them.

Beckley establishes a framework for measuring this amorphous concept called ‘power’ and examines future power trends using net, rather than gross, indicators. Much of his analysis compares the US to China as the only other world power that could conceivably challenge US hegemony in the foreseeable future. He examines their economies focussing on their relative efficiency, as well as their military capabilities taking into account the relative capability of weapon systems, training, and internal efficiencies and costs. He also discusses what he sees are the threats to US power, both internal and external.

He discusses the shortcomings of the two most common methods of trying to measure power; the power as resources approach, and the power as outcomes approach. Ultimately he attempts to develop a hybrid approach to provide a more accurate measure of relative power and uses historical examples of great power rivalries (such as the Opium Wars of the 1800s and the Cold War) to support his methodology. He then applies his methodology to the current rivalry between the US and China.

He examines many aspects of economic performance from industrial and agricultural productivity and innovation through to rates of incarceration, internal security, natural capital and pollution. His analysis reveals the US to be far ahead of China in almost every respect and, indeed, his assessment of China’s prospects are so bleak that it makes it impossible to see China as a real economic rival. He also examines other factors such as US control or influence over international financial markets. His analysis in this respect is very solid and compelling.

His military analysis, however, is not quite as strong. He illustrates, for example, a scenario of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Now there’s doubt that such a venture would be exceedingly difficult for the Chinese with a low probability of success. Beckley’s analysis, however, does seem overly optimistic about Taiwan’s ability, with US support of course, of repelling a Chinese attack. He examines each aspect of military capability in isolation from each other, which, of course, is not how things would work in a full blown invasion. He talks about how easy it would be to bomb Chinese transports as they cross the strait to Taiwan as if those transports would not have air and sea escorts. He talks about how easily Taiwanese forces could mass ashore to repel a Chinese amphibious landing with no mention of pre-landing bombardment or naval gunfire support. It’s not that I necessarily disagree with Beckley’s conclusions, but I do feel that his methodology in this instance is somewhat flawed, and therefore is not as compelling as it could be. The flaw in his analysis is revealed when he examines whether the Chinese could bomb Taiwan into submission stating that “no state has ever conquered another with air power alone.” This is indeed true, but no state would try to conquer another with air power alone. Rather, air power would form one essential part of a broader campaign. His analysis of the situations in the East and South China Sea, though, is much sounder.

Beckley goes on to use a number of economic and military indicators to predict the future prospects of the eight most powerful nations in the world. He identifies three main drivers of long-term economic growth; geography, institutions and demography, and identifies a number of different performance indicators within these drivers. While the US does not come out on top of all of the indicators, it ranks highly across the board. Beckley’s analysis is, again, well-researched and difficult to fault.

He concludes with some interesting foreign policy proposals which he believes would help to maintain US predominance, including some interesting proposals about how the US should engage with North Korea, and advocating a greatly diminished role in the Middle East. Many of his proposals may be seen as ‘hawkish’, such as providing numerous weapons systems to friendly countries in Europe and Asia in order to ‘contain’ Russia and China; however, he balances this with a conservative approach to the US’s perceived position as the ‘global policeman.’ He points to the combined costs and, at best, questionable outcomes of the conflicts in the Balkans, Middle East and Afghanistan to support his argument. He advocates the resurrection of the Powell Doctrine in this regard. He also advocates that Congress should resurrect its authority to regulate the use of force; an authority that it has largely abrogated since the end of the Cold War. And a reimplementation of a war tax for any military operations that require supplemental funding.

Beckley is very accomplished writer. He conveys his ideas clearly and is able to explain sometimes complex issues in a manner that is relatable and easy to understand. He also puts an interesting spin on his analysis, such as comparing military might to an extortion racket; “extracting concessions and favours from weaker countries through threats of violence and offers of protection.”

Overall, this is an excellent examination of the US’s current position as the world’s only great power, and its future prospects of remaining so. It is thoroughly researched, readable and compelling. There are, in my opinion, some flaws in Beckley’s military analysis, but that does not detract from his overall conclusions. A highly recommended read.