This book was well researched and put together. There was great emphasis placed on identifying the statements and actions/inactions of the Fed and Treasury Secretary and then explaining where other actions and statements contradicted these. The book reads well, at times it reiterates its premise or theory about the poor action taken by Paulson et al a few too many times, but in whole I found it interesting and worth reading.

Based on careful analysis of a vast amount of available records relating to Lehman Brothers, and the financial crisis that lead to its demise, Professor Ball presents compelling evidence that the Fed could have prevented or delayed the firm's bankruptcy. Besides avoiding a rushed and chaotic liquidation, and enabling Lehman's creditors to recoup an additional $100 billion or more of what they were owed, this would likely have avoided a great deal of the economic pain caused by the global financial crisis. Ball demonstrates how political interference in the Fed's handling of the issues surrounding Lehman Brothers was the main cause of this debacle. I recommend this book for anyone who really wants to know what happened during the key stages of the financial crisis.

The recent financial crisis is a hobbyhorse of mine, I seem to be unable to stop reading about it. Luckily, some seem to be unable to stop writing about it, this book being released a decade (holy shit, has it been that long?) after the events in question took place.

“The Fed and Lehman Brothers” present a thorough examination of Lehman’s failure, the events and thought process behind letting it happen and the firm’s actual condition at the time. The author’s argument strikes me as cohesive, sound and generally well-articulated. There are several crumbs of information I wish got more attention (such as Lehman’s SIVs), but regardless, Ball’s conclusions are well supported and exceptionally researched. He does an outstanding job at avoiding lazy conclusions and emotional appeals.
The book started as a monograph for professional audiences, which shows, most revealingly so in the structure: Ball describes his sources meticulously and repeatedly, and qualifies every chapter and argument with short summaries and introductions. Repetition in general is ever-present and somewhat tiring, while the reader may need periodic refreshers on numbers being discussed, every mention of “administration” does not need to have “British version of bankruptcy” amended. One can remember that. Hopefully, such lingering traces of academic writing are further remedied in the published version. Thankfully, the style itself is quite engaging, though rather uneven, and makes for a fast-paced read, despite the complex subject matter.

In general, the book is informative and valuable, one I would recommend to those with a deep, rather than cursory, interest in the 2008 finial crisis.

Laurence M. Ball has written a phenomenal summary of the most important moment of modern financial history: the failure of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The author provides evidence that important decisions were made due to politics and the fallout from that.