"Retreat from Moscow" is a well researched and in depth look at the World War 2 era German retreat from Moscow. It was something I heard of in school but I really enjoyed reading a more in depth look into it.

This is an excellent, well-researched book that would make a great foundational text for a college history class. It might be a little deep for the average reader. There are visuals that are interesting, but hard to see on an e-reader.

Thanks to the publishers and NetGalley for a digital ARC.

A splendid piece of historical writing, by a New Zealander who was educated in Melbourne, London, and Berlin, and who now is teaching in Canberra. (The Commonwealth still lives!) Dr Stahel makes an intriguing story out of Germany's withdrawal from the gates of Moscow by arguing that it wasn't the catastrophe usually presented to us, but a successful campaign and a victory of sorts. Yes, the Ostheer (Eastern Army) was regularly overwhelmed by masses of Red Army soldiery, and yes, it was unprepared to fight at temperatures as low as 40 degrees below zero. (The one temperature at which Celsius and Fahrenheit agree.) These were the same factors that had defeated Napoleon in 1812, but Hitler's army did not collapse as the Grande Armée had done. The following year, in Italy, the Anglo-American-Indian-Polish armies would discover how costly it was to confront a "defeated" German army, whose principles of Augfragtaktik (leading from the front) and "offensive defense" (continually counterattacking) made it a deadly foe. In the winter of 1941-1942, it was the Red Army that paid the blood price, losing half a million men each month to the German defenders. A book worth reading, preferably in print with an atlas close at hand.

This work is massive in scope, involving vast geographic areas and millions of men. It does not discuss the retreat from Moscow at the individual soldier’s level, but at the corps and army level. We are treated to the workings of the very highest-ranking German generals on the Eastern Front. David Stahel, the author, is a professional historian, teaching both at the University of New South Wales and the Australian Defence Force Academy. This is the latest in a number of books he has written about the German Army on the Eastern Front during World ll. His purpose in writing this book is to show that the German retreat from Moscow was a victory “tactically, operationally, and even strategically”, and not a defeat as is often claimed by other historians.
Retreat From Moscow is also a very detailed telling of the German high command’s three-way battle with the Communists, Hitler, and the Russian winter. It is packed with historical facts of which most people are generally unaware. Which German general on the Eastern Front could mostly be likened to U.S. General Omar Bradley, the “soldier’s general”? Which side’s generals were most afraid to contradict their ruler? What motivated Hitler to give the Halt Order, thus preventing his armies from making orderly and life saving retreats in the face of vastly superior numbers? Why did the Communists throw wave after wave of mass attacks against well-entrenched National Socialist armies? These and many other questions are answered here.
The author’s treatment of the Wehrmacht Generals is uneven. At times it seems as if the author has taken a break from writing and then come back in a different frame of mind. This is particularly true in his treatment of Field Marshal Kluge, the commander of Army Group Center. Stahel shows a particular animus towards General Heinz Guderian, but does not tell the reader why. This may have been developed in one of the author’s earlier works. There is an impression that perhaps things were said in Mr. Stahel’s earlier books that should have been repeated for clarity’s sake in this volume. Stahel blames Guderian for the German army’s failure to be prepared for winter warfare. This hardly seems fair, though, because Guderian was a blitzkrieg general who had no expectation of having to fight winter warfare. The author also appears ambivalent in his attitude toward the opposing forces. He illustrates some of the German’s inexcusable treatment of Russian civilians, but insinuates that reports of Russian brutality toward German prisoners were mere rumors. He never calls the Soviets “Communists”, but usually refers to the Germans as “Nazis.” The writer does show human understanding for the suffering of the Wermacht troops in the field, but very little for the generals. One might expect a professional historian to show a bit more detachment than our author does, but there may be a good explanation for this. He is an academic, after all, writing in an environment not known for its tolerance of deviation from expected viewpoints.
On the whole, this is a very good book, especially for professional historians and serious students of history. For casual readers, it could be one or two hundred pages shorter. It is to be heartily recommended, but not in its e-book version. Professor Stahel makes generous use of maps and footnotes, which can be extremely difficult to utilize in an e-book edition.
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Edward J. Ward

The author's painstaking research and attention to detail is obvious in the writing of this book. There were many facts that I only discovered after reading this!

Free ARC from Net Galley

General Sherman said "War is hell" and after reading this you will find little to argue

Well researched, painfully so a t times for the minor student but the brutality of what we often still see, great soldiers and substandard leaders teach a lesson of bad results armies are still subject to today. Brutal and cold as the steppes it takes place on; read with a blanket.

Once, I watched a friend build frames for a renovation on his house. He built a solid frame that would hold up under building codes, but he didn’t know why those codes existed. How did the code relate to the actual loading and structural requirements? What was really happening with the loads in the frames? How did the load transfer from the ceiling to the walls to the ground? As a structural engineer, all of that stuff was my language. My friend didn’t understand any of it, but that didn’t stop him from building a structurally sound frame. When I read history books, I sometimes feel that way. I learn something from the texts but not as much as someone immersed in history. When it comes to Retreat from Moscow by David Stahel, I definitely felt that way. I enjoyed this book, but I’m not sure I got everything out of it that someone more versed in World War II military history could get. From the introduction, I knew this would be a very deep, very well researched book. David Stahel didn’t disappoint. Retreat from Moscow is a book with big aims at revising a bit of WWII military history.

TL;DR

David Stahel’s Retreat from Moscow provides a comprehensive, effective argument for looking anew at the battles of the 1941-1942 German winter campaign. Highly recommended for history and WWII buffs.

Review: Retreat from Moscow

It’s commonly accepted that the winter of 1941-1942 was Germany’s first defeat. But in his previous work, David Stahel argued that the first defeat and the turning of the war occurred in the summer of 1941. In Retreat from Moscow, he argues that Germany wasn’t as defeated as the current narrative would suggest. The Red Army paid a heavy price with the front line stabilizing deep in Soviet territory from February to March of 1942. The book is meticulously built around proving this argument through exquisitely researched details. The notes and bibliography at the end of the book are detailed, numerous, and comprehensive. The bibliography is broken out into archival, websites, primary and secondary sources. All this research punctuates the text with more than just statistics; the maps helped me locate the detailed movements. Usually, I’m not a big map fan, but they worked for me in this book for some reason.

Retreat from Moscow starts in early December 1941 with the beginning of the Soviet counteroffensive to the halt Hitler ordered in mid-December to the supply crisis of Christmas 1941 to the end of January 1942. Twenty-one chapters of detailed description and analysis that supports his conclusion. The Germans weathered the Soviet offensive by causing massive casualties among the Red Army. Stahel dictates the ups and downs of this campaign with accessible writing that held my attention. The writing is lively and tells a story rather than a dry recitation of the facts. This is excellent historical writing.

Depth

Retreat from Moscow is a deep book. Stahel moves from the unit level movements to the greater strategic decisions being made. The information is dense while remaining readable. Stahel has done extensive research. Of all the nonfiction books I’ve read this year, Stahel has collected the largest endnotes and bibliography. I cannot imagine the amount of work that went into just preparing for this book. His notes must be a few books unto themselves. I wonder if war gamers could use the book to reenact the winter campaign because the descriptions are so in-depth.

As much as I enjoyed this book, I didn’t know enough to get everything out of it that a military history buff could. It might have been too much for me at this point in my studies of World War II. The troop level movements were interesting, but I preferred the strategy and tactics a level up from there. I think for the casual history reader, this might be too information. However, the casual history reader can still enjoy Stahel’s work.

Did Stahel Argue Effectively?

In the introduction, Stahel states his thesis well and clearly. He uses the rest of the book as supporting arguments. So, was he successful? That’s a question for someone more knowledgeable about this material than I am. Success here would be defined as changing the current view of the winter campaign. It would also be defined among the scholars of WWII military history. Has he changed the course of the dialogue around the winter campaign? I don’t know. However, he argued effectively enough that I now view the winter campaign in a different light. Though Germany retreated, the high cost to the Red Army and the front line remaining deep in Soviet territory cannot be called a victory for the Soviet Union.

Conclusion

David Stahel’s Retreat from Moscow spares no detail in analyzing the German and Soviet troop movements. This in-depth account of the 1941-1942 winter campaign is a must have for military history fans. Retreat from Moscow caters to the hardcore scholars but is accessible to even the average history buff like me. Stahel have given us an excellent historical analysis. Recommended.

7.5 out of 10!

Riding on the back of research that can only be appropriately described as ‘monumental’, David Stahel’s “Retreat From Moscow”, portrays in an unsparing and eviscerating fashion, Germany’s ill-fated winter campaign between 1941 – 1942. Drawing on new sources of history, Mr. Stahel argues that the despotic dictator Adolf Hitler’s “first defeat” took place as early as in the summer of 1941. Operation Barbarossa (the code name for Hitler’s invasion of the Soviet Union) which was to have culminated in the Fuhrer securing his much trumpeted Lebensraum (living space) in the East, instead transformed into a bloodied and blithering blunder of irredeemable proportions. From the beginning of 1941 till early 1942, both the Wehrmacht and the Red Army, competed with each other in resorting to tactics that were inexplicable and maneuvers that could only be termed indecipherable. It would be wrong to foist the responsibility for such mindless mechanics solely upon the Generals commanding their troops. While Hitler and Army High Command (Oberkommando des Heeres –OKH)’s Halt Orders and War Directives prohibiting beleaguered groups from withdrawing, in the face of a continued and relentless onslaught had the German Army in a bind, Stalin’s equally incalculable but vengeful determination to hurl everything the Soviets had at a more experienced and well entrenched opposition, in spite of staggering losses of life and limb had the Soviet forces in veritable tatters. What’s more all of this fighting was being conducted in the most inhospitable and treacherous of conditions. For e.g. the diary of Erich Hager claimed that on the 6th of December, the thermometer had reached minus 46 degrees Celsius near Tula.

As Mr. Stahel painstakingly informs us, what prevented the German army from a complete annihilation was the ingrained hall-mark system of “mission oriented tactics” (Auftragstaktik) which enabled bold “initiatives” to be taken at the front. A combination of brazen and tactful disregard of Hitler’s “retain-ground-at-any-cost” instruction resulted in the Germans retreating to temporary safety.

The Soviets, suffering from an appalling lack of leadership and experience did not have the luxury of any mission oriented tactics. Drawing upon statistics provided by Lev Lopukhovsky and Boris Kavelerchik, Mr. Stahel informs his readers about the casualties suffered by the Big Bear. “. revised upward the Soviet winter total, arriving at more than 1.6 million Soviet losses, which tells its own story when set against the German total of just 262,524 casualties for a slightly longer period (November 26, 1941, to February 28, 1942).

Pandering to Hitler’s whims and wanton mood swings, his coterie, as Mr. Stahel demonstrates, filtered information coming in from the front thereby distorting the actual goings on and feeding the murderous leader only what he wanted to hear. The likes of Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel who controlled the Fuhrer’s Headquarters and Franz Halder, then chief of staff of the Army High Command (OKH), provided detailed instructions to the “Generals” about both the news to be conveyed and the manner which was to be adopted while presenting oneself before Hitler. However, as Mr. Stahel demonstrates with extraordinary clarity and verve, there were brave and brilliant Generals and Commanders who cocked a snook at the famous “halt order” (Halthefehl) issued by their Supreme leader. Chief amongst such dissenters was the immensely respected and incredibly measured Günther Adolf Ferdinand von Kluge. The man who later on became an active conspirator in the 20 July plot to assassinate Hitler, and who took his own life on 19 August 1944, when the plot failed, was almost single handedly responsible for the Army Group Centre remaining intact during the winter campaign. As Mr. Stahel elaborates, “His so called “middle solution” sought, under the most difficult circumstances, to chart a response between the all-out retreat practiced by the likes of Heinz Guderian and the fanatical resistance demanded by Hitler. Kluge’s limited withdrawals sought to avoid exhausting the men, while seeking to preserve as much equipment as possible.” This was no easy task, especially considering the predilections of Hitler to ingloriously sack anyone possessing the will, if not the temerity to challenge his diktat. An unfortunate but classic case in point was the case of Walther von Brauchitsch, a Field Marshal and Commander-in-Chief. Contemptuously treated or mistreated by Hitler, this decorated war veteran was dishonorably discharged from his duties upon incurring the wrath of his leader.

The German’s while strategically retreating from the positions that they had captured and occupied followed a scorched earth policy. Burning every village in their wake, their main objective was to leave not one structure standing or one inhabitable building intact. For example, in December 1941 the retreating forces of Schmidt and Guderian’ s armies wreaked wanton misery upon both people and property in Orel. “An MG 42 was set up in the main aisle of a church. Then the Russian men, women and children were made to shovel snow; then they were taken into the church, without knowing at all what was happening. They were shot immediately with the MG 42 and petrol was poured on them and the whole place was set on fire.”

With the propaganda machine on both the warring sides working overtime, the losses incurred by each side was grossly overestimated by their opponents. The propaganda Minister and a rabid Nazi, Josef Goebbels cranked out incredulous quantum of fictitious victories thereby satiating the anxious Germans. The Soviet Union on the other hand had its own share of mercurial writers such as Ilya Ehrenberg, churning out reams of glorious battle field exploits which either had taken place only in the author’s mind or whose outcomes grossly exaggerated glorifications.

While two sparring vainglorious and pretentious men played dice with the future of their respective countries and country men, the gallant soldiers who were sacrificial pawns in the broader scheme of things fell prey to a legion of uncontrollable factors. A crippling loss of materiel, and men not to mention the specter of frost bite and lice infestation, took an enormous toll. “While epidemic typhus was the most common of louse-borne diseases on the Eastern Front, it was not the only disease transmitted by the lice. Rickettsia Quintana caused trench fever, and Borrelia recurrentis, relapsing fever. There was also spotted fever, but this was spread by mites, ticks, and fleas, not lice.” Consumption of the stimulant Pervitin, colloquially termed Panzerschokolade (tank chocolate) became rampant and led to the drug being subject to the Reich opium law.

Ultimately, when the dust settled and the spoils of war were temporarily counted, both sides were left not just licking their wounds or massaging hurt prides. They were left to nurse permanently etched scars that would haunt them for not just their lives, but future generations as well. To quote Willy Peter Reese, who was in the eye of the storm and was returning home on furlough:

“I lived on the edge. Death, the blind strangler, had failed to find me, but a human being had died in Russia, and I didn’t know who it was…We were required to subject our own lives to the will of the age, and our destiny began like a tale of duress, patience, and death. We could not escape the law, there was a breach in our unfinished sense of the world, and, like a dream, the march into the other and the unknown began, and all our paths ended in night.”

“Retreat from Moscow” – a Masterpiece dealing with a perfectly avoidable tragedy; or was it inescapable?