To Defeat the Few: The Luftwaffe’s campaign to destroy RAF Fighter Command, August–September 1940 was an interesting read and I highly recommend it. Five plus stars.

Authors of books examining aspects of almost any WW2 campaign or battle face an increasing problem, as there is little that has not been exhaustively covered elsewhere; nowhere is this more true than in analyses of the Battle of Britain. The authors of ‘To Defeat the Few’ therefore faced a substantial challenge; to their credit they have succeeded in providing an analysis that offers some new insights by invoking 21st century doctrine as it applies to campaigns that seek to achieve air superiority or air supremacy.

Inevitably, there is much that will be familiar to readers of other books covering the Battle of Britain, although the consistent analysis and narrative from a Luftwaffe perspective is illuminating and perhaps not always comfortable to a reader brought up on the myths of the campaign, rather than the reality. Whilst this is not the only work to explore the campaign from this perspective, it does offer some unique insights and a vast amount of detail over the backgrounds of some key players. This latter point is used to good effect in offering insights into why certain key strategic decisions were taken, which compromised the Luftwaffe’s ability to achieve its strategic objectives relating to the planned Nazi invasion of Britain.

From this reader’s perspective, at least, there were one or two omissions from what is otherwise a very comprehensive account. The authors may reasonably feel that these are covered elsewhere, but readers coming new to this area might have appreciated a little more about: the objective assessment of strengths and weaknesses of the main fighter aircraft (this is hinted at but left unresolved); the relative benefits of defending home airspace where defenders not killed or seriously wounded can be quickly redeployed in the fighting formations, whereas enemy airmen shot down over land are inevitably lost to the attacking forces; and more than a passing reference to how the lessons learned from the conflict were absorbed and informed future doctrine and tactics. However, these comments should be seen as only minor criticisms of what is an excellent account and analysis of this pivotal moment in WW2.

Douglas C. Dildy, a former fighter pilot and Colonel in the United States Air Force, and Paul F. Crickmore,  a former air traffic controller and a well-known aviation enthusiast have written, "To Defeat The Few"  published by Osprey Publishing. This books seeks to provide a more balanced view of the fighting over Britain, with the authors having had greater access to material from the Luftwaffe, (German Air Force) and other sources of Nazi Germany of those times.

The conclusion, of course, is foregone. The Luftwaffe failed in its objective of destroying the Royal Air Force (RAF) to facilitate an early invasion of England by Hitler's forces. The failure was not so much for the lack of fighting spirit or bravery on the part of the Luftwaffe pilots. Although the Luftwaffe was numerically far superior than the RAF, the biggest cause of its failure was the clear lack of strategic leadership. For all his vanity and supposed exploits as a fighter pilot of World War I, Reichsmarschall Hermann Goering could not provide the leadership that was required. Certainly his leadership was mediocre in comparison with that provided by Air Chief Marshall Sir Hugh " Stuffy' Dowding , the chief of RAF Fighter Command.

The book traces the air war over Britain from the time the BEF was left stranded on the beaches of Dunkirk following Hitler's blitzkrieg till the time the invasion of England was formally called off by Hitler. It covers the relative strengths and weaknesses of the fighting units, the challenges they faced, and their respective successes and failures. It highlights how, largely for the purpose of propaganda and for lifting the morale of the public, vastly exaggerated claims were made on both sides of  "kills" in air combat.

It also details the backgrounds and contributions of all the leaders in the air war on both sides, the RAF as well as the Luftwaffe. It is interesting to see how superior technology came to the aid of the Allies by way of early warning systems. The fact that German codes were cracked by the British Intelligence gave them yet another edge in the battle.

Overall, this book is a comprehensive account of the battles in the Luftwaffe's campaign to destroy RAF's Fighter Command in 1940. Students of military history and World War II buffs like me will vastly enjoy the book.

I am grateful to Osprey for providing me with an advance review copy of "To Defeat the Few." The authors of this book, Douglas C. Dildy and Paul F. Crickmore do a creditable job of revisiting the oft told tale of the Battle of Britain. Perhaps their primary goal is to put this struggle into a somewhat neglected modern perspective. That is to say, they couch the struggle as being something unique in history up to that point in that it pitted two fairly evenly matched modern air forces in a struggle for strategic ascendancy (air supremacy) in order to facilitate or deny the necessary preconditions for a successful seaborne invasion of the United Kingdom. In addition, they are careful to note that this task was complicated for the Germans by the fact that the UK offered the first instance in modern warfare of an integrated air defense network, including radar. For the reader familiar with some of the voluminous materials available on this struggle, the text is not particularly startling in its conclusions, and in keeping with its central concern, it is primarily focused on the Luftwaffe's experience of the battle. For this reason, I would recommend it primarily for those who have not spent much time studying this very well documented aerial combat. This is not to say that it offers nothing to the well read historian, but it is the relative novice who will most benefit from its analysis.