Last year I read a book (Memory Makers: The Politics of the Past in Putin's Russia by Jade McGlynn) which went into some depth as to how Russia currently sees itself in the world and the internal propaganda around building a shared national history that marks them as underdogs and justifies a national pathology of paranoia. What it didn't do so much, and Hubris fills in the gap admirably, is consider to what degree external factors, geopolitical and other nations' foreign policy, also forced Putin's hand. Haslam has very little time for anyone involved here, though the biggest perpetrators are the successive US Presidents who have chopped, changed and generally belittled Russia since the fall of the Iron Curtain. A lack of clarity with NATO's mission, and how they wanted to expand it, whilst also giving Russia commitments that they would go up to their borders, are clearly paradoxical, and Haslam does an excellent job of documenting conversations on the record, and many which were off the record, to show a gran streak of hypocrisy.

What comes out at the centre of Hubris - a very well chosen title - is an absolute lack of geopolitical empathy. Whilst it is understandable that the US and the West might have wanted to celebrate the end of the Cold War, and indeed triumphing in said shadow conflict, its nature as a war of primarily propaganda and economics meant that the lessons learnt from World War One for example were not followed here. Russia was not in ruin physically, there were no bomb sites that needed reconstruction. But once the Soviet bloc dissolved, and with no real sense of how to set up a capitalist democracy (and bad actors taking advantage), the years of hyper-inflation were inevitable. Yeltsin's own weakness in places, plus the growth of power of ex-KGB oligarchs all while a succession of US administrations appeared to be favouring the Eastern European states. Germany, often a key middleman, had its own issues with reunification, and at the heart of US foreign policy was the question about how to restructure NATO now that its very reason for existing had seemingly vanished. The Eastern European ex-Soviet states were keen to stop any return to Russian imperialism, Russia was keen to leave its options open with NATO at its borders. All of which had to play with a general Western misunderstanding that even if the Russian people in general were happy to be rid of communism (which wasn't a given), there was still a general sense of national humiliation, stupidity and loss when you lose an Empire (see Brexit).

Hubris is a very detailed, if mildly partisan, take on the story (my sense is that Haslam goes in a little harder on Clinton and Obama's mistakes - though that might be because they are in power at two very key junctures - Russian restructuring and the invasion of the Crimea). Its main point though is a call for geopolitical empathy, the more political failure books I read the more it seems the job is next to impossible. He also very much enjoys calling the UK the Monkey to the USA's organ grinder, which is a sense of where he feels the blame lives. I do think it needs to be read with a book about the internal issues in Russia - Memory Makers being a good example - and it ends in a surprisingly hopeful place for Ukraine (he believes that however it happens this is Putin's last act).

Absolutely fascinating.

I have been intrigued by Russian history since my A levels when we covered the Russian revolution. If you believe one of the possible outcomes of Russia's war in Ukraine then you never know, we might see another one in my lifetime.

Jonathan Haslam is a professor of Hostorical Studies at Princeton. He has a particular interest in the history of the former Soviet Union and has written extensively on this subject. I'd rather listen to his opinion (and it is an opinion) than some secretary of state who has been in the job for 6 months.

I thought this book was an excellent summation of how we have arrived at this appalling situation. If you pick up the book and look at the cover you'd imagine the hubris to be Putin's but, unfortunately, because we seem to learn nothing from history in the west, it is ours as well.

The book takes us back to the origins of the conflict which begin after the official end of the Cold War then the end of the Soviet Union and the Berlin Wall coming down. The work of foreign powers to bring about a more democratic Russia (in the image of the USA), the collapse of the Yeltsin government and the rise of Putin have all played their part. Suffice it to say Haslam draws some uncomfortable conclusions about the role of the USA and western governments in bringing about the invasion of Ukraine.

If you're put off by the size of the book please bear in mind that one third of it is a glossary of source materials.

This certainly is a book worth reading. It draws some unsettling conclusions but, as we all know, the history of the world can turn on a dime and who knows what will happen following the US elections later this year. And if you think Putin is a Trump supporter you might want to read this too. Source material says otherwise.

Excellent. Highly recommended.

Thankyou to Netgalley and Head of Zeus for the advance review copy. Very much appreciated.

I am grateful to NetGalley for providing an advance copy of this book in exchange for my honest review. 

This book, subtitled “The Origins of Russia’s War Against Ukraine” is written by a British historian and author who mostly writes about the Soviet Union and Russia. He is associated with multiple prominent UK and US ‘Ivy-League’ universities. While this may have been something to emphasis the author’s credentials in the past, given the behaviour we have observed from many universities of late (problematic and very public views around several issues including politics, culture and finance) I’m a little wary now of certain academic and ‘elite’ viewpoints of history.

The context of this book surrounds the views, actions and events of the decades following World War II, leading up to the current war in Ukraine. Particular emphasis is placed on the downfall of the Soviet Union and repercussions since. We are given a summary of Cold War issues and the largely self-inflicted disintegration of the Soviet Union; events welcomed by Europe, the US and of course the many ‘Soviet’ States that suffered under Russian domination. The contributing role of Europe, the US and in particular NATO is presented along with multiple references, footnotes and quotations.

I found the factual elements of these decades useful and the Russian views (or at least those of the Russian ‘elites’, various diplomats, military, politicians and business leaders) informative and enlightening. However the author’s tone, language, presentation of facts, his views and conclusions are largely anti-American, occasionally anti-European and seldom critical of Russia. One is left with an excellent recounting of events but a biased almost apologetic view of Russia’s actions leading up to the 2014 and 2022 Ukraine invasions.

Nevertheless, this book is a great reference for those unfamiliar with or perhaps forgetful of the events of past decades. The author explains Russia’s concerns since WW II, particularly related to NATO expansion and the perceived ‘threat’ to the Soviet Union. Post the break-up of the Soviet Union, continued NATO expansion is a constant theme the author describes along with his views, and those of the US, Europe and Russia.

The author assigns much of the blame of the current conflict to NATO and Western leaders. Other background and foreground events are presented as contributory factors. The breakup of Yugoslavia, German Unification, European and American domestic & international politics and ambitions. Two Gulf Wars, conflicts in Kosovo and Georgia plus the ‘Arab Spring’ are presented, adding to the perceived threats and humiliations felt by Russia. More recent conflicts in the Arab world, particularly Libya and Syria are also presented alongside Russia’s actions, justifications and views. And of course the rise of Putin is documented and explained.

The author of course has the benefit of hindsight in forming his views and opinions as well as abundant published and private material now available. Perhaps this in some ways explains the superior, snide and sometime snarky references to US and European politicians, diplomats and military figures. Abundant quotations are presented, all referenced but frequently the context is unclear. Facts are presented as “undeniable” or “without question true”. Qualifications which are presumably not necessary, and leave me feeling a little uneasy. While participants in the West are usually named, castigated and much-maligned, those in Russia are often anonymous and vaguely referred to as Russians with certain “thoughts”, “views” or “feelings”. Given that author writes in English and perhaps his references are dominantly also in English, this is somewhat understandable. Nevertheless, it distracts from the factual events recounted and adds to the overall anti-American pro-Russian tone.

Few of the Western politicians, diplomats and military leaders receive any accolades for their actions. Disturbingly, the author judges their morals and judgements, as well as what he sees as their venal and self-serving behaviour. While Russian officials seem to be more generally viewed with tolerance, understanding and a grudging respect. Whilst he may have a point, indeed several valid points regarding Western officials, none of this actually justifies Russia’s 2014 and 2022 invasions into Ukraine. Are these invasions really the equivalent of the West ‘removing Kosovo from Serbia’ ?

The book draws to a conclusion shortly after the full-scale 2022 invasion of Ukraine, with abundant blame for various administrations including Reagan, Bush (HW), Clinton, Bush (W) Obama, Trump, Biden, Merkel, Macron and many more familiar names. Putin’s power has consolidated over time. The West has become ambivalent towards external conflicts. Europe has become reliant on Russia for energy resources providing prosperity.

Apart from the occasional glaring error (referring to Nord Stream II as an oil pipeline…) in totality, the book is an excellent, largely chronological recounting of events, issues, key decisions and outcomes over many decades, leading up to the war in Ukraine today. The interpretations and assumptions along with snide personal remarks clearly show the authors bias, which distracts from the factual narrative. Perhaps most useful are the author’s recounting of the Russian officials; their historical views, concerns, perceived humiliations and the circumstances that lead to their interventions and military actions in several countries, including of course Ukraine. This narrative allows the reader to better understand the Russian Worldview; without accepting or indulging their aggressive behaviour and attitudes.

Despite the above critique, I enjoyed this book, often seeking further information online when a particular person, issue or event left me wanting to know more. I recommend it to anyone unfamiliar with or forgetful of Soviet/Russian and Western/US views, activities and relationships since World War II. The author makes clear Russia’s justification for invasions of Ukraine. After reading this book, I am much better informed of the views and actions from many participants. Nevertheless, I remain unconvinced the historical analysis, perceived threats and humiliations justify the Russian actions we see today.

The book delves in-depth to understand the underlying Russian psyche behind the aggressive/expansionist nature of Putin and his supporters. It seems that the arrogance of several former leaders in the US and some European states, coupled with the expansion of NATO put in motion a strong ripple effect of anger in Russia. Having travelled extensively in Russia, during the 90's, I have met a number of educated Russians who believed that the West lied to the USSR when the Warsaw Pact was disbanded. The Russian people were seemingly led to believe by Gorbachev that NATO would also be reduced in size, and would not expand into Eastern Europe.

The author has undertaken a massive amount of research and almost every statement and speech etc is backed up by references. From the reader's perspective, the book reads as a thesis and unfortunately is quite heavy in parts. Notwithstanding, it is a very interesting slant and personal perspective on why Russia went to war with Ukraine.

There is no doubting the credentials of the author when it comes to an analysis of the political history of the Soviet Union, and the evolution of Putin’s autocratic Russia, via the chaos of the Yeltsin years. His detailed knowledge of the key players, their thinking - as evidenced by documents and published speeches - and how their views of America (in particular) and the West in general have changed over time is impressive. However, the interpretation of events since the fall of the Soviet Union, particularly since Putin’s accession to the Presidency of Russia, appears to suffer from an inconsistency in relation to objectivity by his manifest distaste for the actions of the United States of America. Few, and certainly not this reviewer, would hold up US foreign policy towards the Middle East and Russia in this period as a model of consistency or selfless pursuit of the highest ideals of statecraft, but Haslam portrays the often inept handling by Presidents and administration officials as evidence of a sometimes malign approach to Russia in general, and Putin in particular.

The Maidan shootings in Kyiv are trailed by Haslam, without ever being explicit, as the likely ‘fault’ of American interference, although he, possibly reluctantly, acknowledges that it is not definitively clear who started the shooting, although the special police action is generally acknowledged to have been brutal. Haslam also makes much of the protests being local rather than widespread, without pausing to consider the possible reasons for that.

The author repeatedly refers to ‘the expansion of NATO’ as if this were simply the hegemonic behaviour of the USA, without pausing to analyse why former Warsaw Pact countries and nations formerly part of the Soviet Union should desperately wish to join the alliance, given the events in Chechnya and Georgia. Haslam acknowledges that Russia has intensified its hybrid warfare actions directed against the West, but does not significantly challenge the Putin narrative about the West having no reason to regard Russia as a potential adversary for the West. As others have pointed out ‘It takes two to tango’.

A fundamental weakness of Haslam’s synthesis of history and its current consequences is his tendency to seemingly argue two mutually contradictory positions: first the West is to blame for not responding more forcefully to sovereignty violations in the Crimea, the Donbas and the BUK shoot down whilst at the same time the West is criticised for eventually regarding the behaviour of Putin as indeed being that of a potential adversary.

The title of the book is ‘Hubris’ and, certainly, the actions of the West, particularly the USA, have at times reflected a poor analysis of the Russian psyche and, more especially, Putin’s mindset. In this regard, and to his credit, Haslam acknowledges in the closing sections of the book that Putin’s invasion of Ukraine was a catastrophic blunder with potentially seriously adverse consequences for Russia, and Putin. However, he is too quick to blame some of Putin’s more outrageous claims over Ukrainian history on his ultra-nationalist friends and advisers. The Ukraine tragedy may indeed owe something to the inept handling by the West, particularly the USA, but questions relating to sovereignty and self-determination require answers reflecting the UN Charter and the wishes of the Ukrainian people. Haslam fails to explain just why it should be that Ukraine must bow to the inevitable simply because Putin wishes to be seen as a latter day Tsar recovering lands once claimed by Catherine the Great - a promise made by Putin in his 2000 Presidential election campaign…….before Ukraine had become the issue it has now become. The question thus becomes - which behaviour more typically reflects the concept of hubris.

This book is definitely worth reading, but needs a modest health warning.