Instrument of War

Instrument of War: The German Army 1914–18 by Dennis Showalter is a history of World War I based on the German participation. Showalter is a retired Professor of History, past President of the Society for Military History and Joint Editor of War in History specializing in comparative military history. He has written or edited two dozen books and a hundred fifty articles.

World War I was the war that could have been prevented, it, however, set the stage for the 20th century. It was the stubbornness of Austria-Hungary and their demands that brought on the violence. From all accounts, the Kaiser thought Serbia had met Austria-Hungary's demands and planned on vacation. Franz Josef took the assassination of his despised nephew as the will of God and saw it as a way of accomplishing what he couldn’t. Unfortunately, his ministers saw things differently and moved to war. Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia. Germany joined its ally. Russia came to the aid of its Slav allies. Germany moved against France, who was bound to aid Russia by treaty. Germany’s move through Belgium brought England to war. Much has been blamed on the entangling alliances as the cause for the war but one must remember too that the NATO alliance (and the Warsaw Pact for that matter) helped keep the peace in the Cold War. WWI was more the fault of faulty leaders than alliances meant to balance power.

World War I was history caught between pages. The advances in technology changed the world. The expansion of railroads meant that mobilization and transportation of troops and equipment could move at previously unattainable speeds. The machine gun was capable of killing on a scale never seen before. The internal combustion engine started to play a role in the military but was still too undependable to be counted on. Horses still played a major role in transportation at this time. That meant pulling animals from the farms which still used and needed them. It also meant feeding the animals. 84,000 horses used by the German’s required almost two million tons of feed a day; this came out of food that would be used by soldiers and civilians. Armies did not adapt to new technologies on the offensive. Killing charging masses of enemy troops is where the machine gun excelled. Advancing armies refused to learn their lesson.

The German army, like most powers, relied on reserve units. It differed in that their reserve units were trained and expected to hold their own in combat. Most nations reserves went to the rear and were used as fillers. The Russian army was in the worst position of the major powers. It’s rail system needed developing and the rally points for mobilization were spread across the vast country. Germany, on the other hand, exercised a near flawless mobilization and continued to be a successful force until it was not only beaten but out-soldiered at Vimy. No one expected a long war and no one was prepared to fight a drawn out war. The German army was statistically successful in creating three casualties for every two it suffered, but allied army size stood against the Germans in a war of attrition. A well-written history of Germany in World War I.

Disclosure: I received a review copy of this book from NetGalley.

Institutional histories can be very dry and only of interest to specialists. Dennis Showalter, however, is at his best and most entertaining within the historical genre. Instrument of War: The German Army 1914-18 is intended for general readers, published by Osprey, and definitely gives newcomers a clear and complete—without being complicated—view of the Wilhelmine Army at war. Showalter is one of America’s leading military historians and one of the foremost authorities on the German Army in any language. Instrument of War is his bread and butter, written with a smooth hand which comes off like a good lecture: full of humor and insight.

Showalter begins by looking at the dramatic transformation of the Prussian Army and State after 1860. In short: 1848 left Prussia with a military which was primarily composed of the Landwehr—the militia—which represented liberal values. The professional force was essentially a small Praetorian Guard, a bastion of conservatism under direct control of the King. In 1860, Albrecht von Roon became Minister of War and forced funding increases through the Landtag (an actual reform bill failed) which allowed the size of the professional army to be increased and the power of the militia reduced. Combined with the planning abilities of Moltke the Elder, this rapidly transformed the Prussian Army from an international punchline into a force which was able to defeat the major powers in Europe: Austria and France. The Army, enlarged, conscripted, and with massive reserve contingents, subsequently became a microcosm of German society. A reader might question why social history is leeching into military history, but consider that a citizen army is composed of citizens and reflects the society it is drawn from.


The social component is also important in putting Wilhelm II into context. Fussy and eager to interfere in military matters, despite being generally ignorant in them, Showalter argues that Wilhelm was generally able to be sidestepped in matters which had an effect by the internal culture of the German military, which reflected the federal nature of the German state. The social component also is interested in filling a hole in scholarship which seeks to link German genocide in its colonies with genocide during WWII. Showalter points out that the colonial service was largely disconnected from continental military concerns, makes convincing argument for it, and therefore the actions of the German Army against civilians needs to be explained only within the context of the German Army’s experiences and perceptions and not as a point of continuity in genocidal actions.

As the German military enters WWI, the story is not one of brilliance but of adaptation. On the Western Front, the Germans inflicted three casualties on their enemies for every two they took. And much of that was under conditions of inferiority in technology and numbers. Showalter carefully details the adaptations the German military—strategic and tactical—engaged in to prolong its ability to fight the war. Very complex ideas are presented as plainly as possible, using everyday language: a skill which Showalter possess in excess.

The work does end abruptly. Showalter is only concerned about the war, and not the postwar. A conclusion could have been more fleshed out and survey how the institutional culture of the army affected the Weimar Republic and the rise of Hitler. There was sufficient foreshadowing within the text to warrant the inclusion.

For general audiences, the book does keep citation to a minimum. It was occasionally frustrating to read something I wanted to know more on and finding no reference for it, or an expectation of an explanatory note being unfulfilled. There are some other issues with the work. Maps would be useful. Despite the work not focusing on operational details, there are still points where geographic locations are mentioned and it would be good to have maps to fix them in space and time.


Additionally, there are a couple weird quirks. What sticks in my mind is that Showalter mentions, at least twice, that the .50 BMG round was based on a German anti-tank rifle round. This is false. The round was based on the .30-06 round, and enlarged. After the war, the German round was used as inspiration for improving performance… but that’s not a genealogical link. I’m being petty in this, because negatives are that hard to find.

Instrument of War should be highly recommended for all audiences, not just general readers. It would act as an outstanding survey for a beginner. As a supplementary text for an undergraduate history course, the work is short enough but comprehensive enough. And specialists will enjoy reading Showalter’s prose.

Book received from NetGalley.

I really loved this book. While I have read some books on World War I and have studied it a little in college classes I really don't know much about the soldiers and their training of the era. I learned quite a bit from this book and will definitely be buying a copy for my own shelves

I will confess that I didn't know too much about this subject which is why I wanted to read the book to expand my knowledge and after reading the book I certainly feel as though I have done that! I thought it was well thought out, concise and clear - I didn't feel overwhelmed by the amount of detail and I thought overall it was an excellent read - I have since purchased a copy for my husband's collection of books on Germany during WWI and WWII